In this paper we introduce a switching error correction model (SECM) estimator that allows for the possibility that price transmission between markets might vary during periods with and without physical trade flows. Applying this new approach to semi-weekly data on tomato markets in Zimbabwe, we find that intermarket price adjustment occurs quickly and as much when there is no trade as when product flows from one market to another. This finding underscores the importance of information flow for market performance.
I. Introduction
A large literature explores the functioning over time of distinct markets that are linked together in a network. This network can be spatial, as in markets for a commodity within a given region or country, or it may represent other kinds of integration, perhaps through vertical marketing channels as product is transformed or through intertemporal arbitrage via storage (Deaton and Laroque, 1996; Williams and Wright, 1991) . The primary purpose of such research is often to determine how quickly markets respond to temporary shocks and how these shocks transmit through the network via price adjustment. The dominant analytical approach has exploited spatial market equilibrium conditions, described in detail by Takayama and Judge (1971) .
Deviations from these equilibrium conditions yield key information on over-all market efficiency. Understanding these dynamics with respect to food markets may be of particular importance for policy makers in developing countries (Fackler and Goodwin, 2002) , where large subpopulations are employed in the agricultural sector and where the considerable budget shares devoted to food expenditures leave many poor households vulnerable to price spikes commonly associated with market disequilibrium.
The underlying theory of spatial market equilibrium suggests particular patterns of price behavior under competitive arbitrage, based on the transactions costs associated with movement of goods between markets and observed trade flows. More specifically, if physical trade flows occur between markets, these markets are said to be in competitive spatial equilibrium if and only if the price differential exactly equals the costs of moving goods between them, such that excess returns to trade are completely exhausted. Further, with constant per unit costs of commerce, any price change in one market due to a local demand or supply shock should generate an equal price change in the other market. This strong spatial price transmission is the familiar Law of One Price.
The absence of trade may also imply that markets are in spatial equilibrium. This can occur when price differentials exactly equal transactions costs, leaving traders indifferent between trading and not trading, or when the intermarket price differentials are insufficient to cover the costs of arbitraging between the markets. Where competitive spatial equilibrium with trade implies strong spatial price transmission, however, this latter, segmented spatial equilibria is consistent with uncorrelated price series as well as with the Law of One Price. Thus spatial price transmission dynamics may be markedly different in periods with and without trade even when markets are always in competitive spatial equilibrium.
Markets may also be out of equilibrium, with either apparent missed arbitrage opportunities (i.e., no trade in spite of intermarket price differentials in excess of the costs of arbitrage) or positive trade in the face of negative returns to arbitrage. The different possible combinations of trade flows and returns to trade are examined in detail in the switching regime branch of the spatial price analysis literature, which finds empirically that markets are frequently out of spatial equilibrium (Barrett and Li, 2002; Baulch, 1997) .
However, this literature is limited in its ability to comment on the actual process of transition between equilibrium and non-equilibrium regimes, as the approach is inherently static and does not make explicit use of the time series nature of the data at hand.
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There is, however, a large body of work that performs spatial price analysis in a fully dynamic sense. But one of the main, latent assumptions of these models is the primacy of trade flows in bringing about spatial equilibrium. This assumption has been largely unexamined thus far in the literature. For the most part, lack of available complementary price, trade flow and transaction cost data has hampered analysts' ability to test empirically whether or not trade flows are the main mechanisms behind spatial equilibrium patterns.
2 , 3 Further, until recently, appropriate methods in cointegration analysis in the presence of multiple regimes did not exist.
We overcome the difficulties of both of these literatures by introducing a method for simultaneously incorporating price, trade flow and transactions costs time series data in order to study the nature of spatial price adjustment dynamics both with and without physical trade flows. We make use of recent, detailed semi-weekly data on tomato markets in Zimbabwe and recent work on threshold cointegration by Gonzalo and Pitarakis (2006) to test for the presence of non-linearities in long run equilibrium relationships and potentially different price transmission patterns under different trading regimes.
Our method allows for useful characterization of market performance with respect to price adjustment while relaxing some strong, and typically indefensible, assumptions on which existing techniques depend. This method thereby provides different, more complete information about spatial price adjustment dynamics. In particular, we are able to test empirically for differences in these dynamics in periods with and without observed trade flows.
The results implicitly demonstrate the importance of mechanisms other than physical trade flows -such as information flows -in linking spatially distinct markets and thereby influencing spatial price adjustment. This reinforces recent findings, such as Jensen (2007) , that more directly demonstrate the impact of new information flows on spatial price and trade patterns. Our application to Zimbabwean tomato markets demonstrates that failure to allow for such structural differences in intermarket price transmission can lead to serious errors of inference with respect to market efficiency.
II. Models of Cointegration and the Switching Error Correction Model
A dynamic study of spatial price adjustment involves analysis of time series data on prices, transactions costs and trade flows between markets. Cointegration models have been used to great effect for this purpose in many spatial analysis studies. 4 These studies make use of the fact that it is possible to use competitive spatial equilibrium conditions to find an error correction representation of the relationship between prices and transactions costs in two different markets, as we explain below. Based on this model, one can then estimate parameters that characterize how market prices adjust to random shocks that temporarily move connected markets out of long run equilibrium.
Error correction models have the attractive property that they allow for analysis of both long run and short run dynamics in the presence of a cointegrating relationship. Short run and long run price adjustment dynamics may be quite different, especially for markets with significant transactions costs, like those for perishable commodities in developing countries. Underlying error correction models is the idea that price time series may display long run equilibrium relationships, but short run deviations from equilibrium may be (at least partly) 'corrected' in subsequent time periods through the particular mechanisms that control price adjustment.
We use a variant of the error correction model to examine the nature of this adjustment in periods with and without trade flows. We are particularly interested in isolating price adjustment in periods without trade flows, in order to establish whether price adjustment is attributable primarily to physical arbitrage associated with trade, or whether it is perhaps equally attributable to non-material flows, presumably of information. 5 This possibility of a distinction between the mechanism behind price adjustment and trade flows is the general reason for the importance of separating spatial market equilibrium from market integration concepts (Barrett, 2001 (Barrett, 2001; Takayama and Judge, 1971) are:
where q ij represents trade flows from market i to market j and q ij represents a trade flow ceiling, (either due to a quota or some other imposed restriction).
Note that in equation (1), the relationship that prevails between prices in different markets depends upon the observed trade flows, q ij . However, as we show below, it is possible for other mechanisms to affect this relationship.
When the equilibrium relationship between P jt and P it binds with equality (as in 1(b)), this equality can be used to develop an error correction representation (Engle and Granger, 1987) of the dynamic relationship between market prices and transactions costs over time, with (1(b)) characterizing the long run equilibrium (i.e., the cointegrating relationship) between markets.
However, in the short run, shocks to prices and/or transactions costs may cause temporary deviations from this equilibrium. In a dynamic context, the long run difference between prices and transactions costs, e t ≡ P jt − P it − τ ijt , should be a stationary process, in that any temporary deviation from long run spatial market equilibrium is expected to disappear over time. For market prices and transactions costs, this process can be expressed quite generally as the residual from the linear estimated relationship in (1b) (Engle and Granger, 1987) :
withê t thus representing an I(0), white noise random variable. 7 Analysis of this residual allows one to establish exactly how long it takes for intermarket price adjustment to return markets to their long run equilibrium state.
If e t truly represents a long run, stationary process, then market prices and transactions costs are said to be cointegrated time series. In the spatial market analysis literature, cointegrated prices and transactions costs are often (if controversially) taken as indicators of the degree of market efficiency in a given network.
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A. The Switching Error Correction Model
In the most basic scenario, an error correction representation of the relationship between price margins, (P jt − P it ≡ m ijt ) and transactions costs (τ t ) can be written as:
In equation (3), the parameters in A (a 2x1 matrix) govern the speed of adjustment of the price margin and transactions costs from short-term shocks back to the long term equilibrium. 9 The Γ d matrices (2x2) provide estimates of the autocorrelation in the system between the price margin and the transactions costs series, with d indicating the lag length(s) included in the estimation. The lagged error correction term,ê t−1 , is used as an instrument for the cointegrating vector that describes the long-term relationship, as shown below:
The model in equation (3) is appropriate only under the assumption that trade flows do not matter to price adjustment dynamics, as it specifies that only one set of parameters govern behavior for the entire length of the time series, instead of distinguishing between periods with and without trade flows.
Recognizing that the model in equation (3) may be too restrictive to represent market relationships with multiple regimes, threshold cointegration models (TAR), initially proposed by Balke and Fomby (1997) , have been used to test spatial market equilibrium in the presence of unobserved constant transactions costs (Dercon and Van Campenhout, 1999; Goodwin and Piggott, 2001; Hansen and Seo, 2002) . These transactions costs divide spatial market data into trade and non-trade regimes, recognizing the fact that within the band of prices defined by the transactions costs (described by equation (5) below):
arbitrage will not be profitable and trade flows should not occur. 11 Therefore estimated transactions costs are often used to define a hypothesized 'band of inaction,' within which spatial price adjustment dynamics are expected to be quite different than outside the band.
Hansen and Seo (2002) present the following, more general model of threshold error correction and divide observations into regimes based on the size of the error correction term in relation to an unobserved threshold, γ.
In terms of spatial price analysis, thresholds of this type may arise when price margins greatly exceed transactions costs, leading to different speeds of adjustment close to and far from the price band. Substituting our price margin and transactions cost data into this framework:
where the estimated long run relationships isê t−1 (B) = m jt−1 −B 0 −B 1 τ it−1 , equilibrium theory suggest. Not only might the speed of adjustment and short run parameters differ between trade and no trade periods, but there may also be different mechanisms at play effectively linking market prices in periods with and without trade.
This is precisely the effect we wish to explore, in order to better understand the role physical trade flows play in bringing about spatial competitive equilibrium via price adjustment. Evidence of cointegration between markets in non-trade periods suggests that the role of physical trade flows may be overstated in the literature and that information flows that may impact market function and efficiency independent of trading activity may be underappreciated. Allowing for complete variation in parameters across trading regimes is therefore critical to our analysis. Gonzalo and Pitarakis (2006) present a method to test for these prospective non-linearities that enables us to specify and estimate the following model (the switching error correction model, SECM): arbitrage is commonly assumed to be the mechanism that returns markets to equilibrium.
Therefore, our null hypothesis is that A no trade = 0 and all the action in spatial price adjustment occurs only during trading periods. Also under the null, the cointegrating vector is the same in both regimes (i.e., B trade = B no trade ). However, in order to conduct this test, we need a method that accounts for the possibility of regime-specific cointegrating relationships. This is because, under the alternative hypothesis, if adjustment is taking place in non-trade periods, then a cointegrating relationship must be present.
However, as it is clearly not due to the effect of trade flows, it could be distinct from the relationship that prevails during trading periods and should therefore be estimated separately.
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Note that, with this definition of the null, we are assuming that a cointegration vector is defined in non-trade periods. Although many of the studies in the spatial price adjustment literature specifically model prices within the price band as a random walk, we are unable to include this possibility in our analysis, given the specification of the threshold cointegration test statistic we plan to use. However, it has been observed that periods without trade may still be consistent with a long run equilibrium relationship, (for example, if all arbitrage opportunities are exhausted such that traders are indifferent between trading and not (Barrett and Li, 2002; Dercon and Van Campenhout, 1999) . Our model generalizes this possibility by allowing the equilibrium relationship in non-trade periods to be distinct from that in the periods with trade.
III. Data
The SECM specified in (7) The primary players in these spot markets are traders who have purchased produce from local smallholder farmers and then sell the tomatoes in the market mostly to low-or middle-income urban consumers. This constitutes a relatively informal marketing structure, with more formal contract farming transactions occurring directly between private wholesalers or other large buyers (such as supermarkets or public institutions like schools) and larger commercial farmers in other venues. Tomato prices are more volatile in these spot markets than in the formal sector, due to the absence of formal contracts and produce perishability.
We study price transmission between the following three directional market pairs: 14 Harare to Gweru, Gweru to Bulawayo, and Harare to Bulawayo.
15
Figures 2-4 plot out the price, transactions costs and trade flow data for the three markets. These three market pairs display the key characteristics necessary to test the SECM, in that the relevant price margins and transfer costs for each pair were both non-stationary and integrated of order one, and trade and non-trade periods were observed for each pair. Engle and Granger (1987) and use the regime-specific residuals as instruments in the final estimation of the SECM model in equation (7).
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IV. Estimation Strategy
V. Results
In this section we present the final estimates of the switching error correction model in equation (7).
A. Gonzalo-Pitarakis test results
We calculated the GP test statistics (and their associated approximate pvalues from Hansen (1997)) for each market pair under consideration, with results shown Table 1 . We also report the corresponding Johansen trace statistics of linear cointegration for comparison were one to impose the assmption of a linear model. 18 As can be seen, all three markets show strong evidence of non-linear cointegration, uniformly significant at the 1% level. Interestingly, the null of zero cointegration cannot be rejected by the Johansen test statistics for two of the markets in question, even at the 10% level. Thus, under maintained hypothesis of a linear model, cointegration between these markets would ordinarily be rejected, suggesting significant market inefficiencies. However, by examining the trade and non-trade regimes separately, we find that spatially distinct Zimbabwean tomato markets appear to have the ability to self-correct via two distinct long-run equilibrium relationships, apparently using different mechanisms in trade and no trade regimes.
B. Switching error correction model estimates
Since the GP test confirmed the desirability of allowing for threshold effects in the cointegrating vector, we next estimated the parameters of equation (7) Examining these parameters more closely, it can be seen that adjustment parameters for the price margin equation are typically significantly different from zero, while those in the transport costs equations are not. During the study period, transport costs were often set administratively by the government. Given that, the lack of adjustment of transport costs to shocks makes perfect sense; none of the adjustment in intermarket prices occurs through changes in the observed transport costs, only through corrections to inter-market price margins. Looking jointly at the A and B parameter estimates, they suggest that unobserved costs drive the error correction process, with corrections occuring entirely through product price adjustment.
The magnitudes of the A parameters also indicate that price margins respond quite quickly to deviations from equilibrium in both regimes, showing a high degree of market efficiency in general for the Zimbabwean tomato markets in question. Table 5 summarizes the implied half-lives for these adjustment parameters (λ T and λ N T for the trade and no trade regimes, respectively), in terms of the average number of days it takes for a shock out of the long-run equilibrium to be halved. The interesting feature of these estimates is that there appears to be qualitatively similar adjustment towards the regime specific long-run equilibrium (at least for the price margins) in both the trade and non-trade periods, in contrast to the oft-assumed dynamic of limited or no adjustment without trade and all the corrections occur thanks to physical arbitrage. The relative swiftness of the adjustment (the longest half life is only about 23 days) may also help to explain the limited amount of autocorrelation in the data, which leads to little explanatory power in the Γ estimates in the model.
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In addition to relatively fast spatial price adjustment overall, the hypothesis that no adjustment occurs in the periods without trade is strongly rejected. Price margins and transport costs return to their (trade regimespecific) long run equilibrium within a few weeks in periods both with and without trade. Given that no produce physically moves between markets in the no-trade regime, clearly price adjustment must instead be due to disem-bodied information flows between markets, whether it is via price speculation by traders, producers' rational expectations about future prices, or producers' unobserved decisions of which market to supply directly. Even trader decisions on where and when to participate in markets serve to effectively link prices in all of the markets in which they operate, even when the decision is not to transport, as their decisions affect local demand and supply conditions in each market. In any case, it seems that information flows lead to swift correction of potential deviations from competitive spatial equilibrium pricing such that price transmission in periods without trade flows is no less effective than when it is mediated by physical arbitrage, even though these regimes appear governed by significantly different mechanisms. Further examination of the specific mechanisms that regulate price transmission is beyond the scope of this paper; but clear, indirect evidence of their existence is perhaps a useful jumping off place for future research.
VI. Conclusions
Using a newly developed test for non-linear cointegration analysis, we spec- Note: * , * * , * * * indicate significant at 10%, 5%; and 1% respectively. Intercept terms in the final VAR have been omitted for clarity. Table 3 : Parameter estimates of equation (7) Table 4 : Parameter estimates of equation (7) 2 See Barrett (1996) for a break down of the types of market analysis methods by data classification.
3 Several studies use various threshold cointegration models to better characterize price dynamics in hypothesized trade and no trade regimes (e.g., Goodwin and Piggott (2001) ) and the possibility of differences between short run and long run equilibrium dynamics (e.g., Dercon (1995) ; Ravallion (1986) ).
4 See Fackler and Goodwin (2002) for a detailed summary.
5 Information flows may, for example, be due to the effect of elaborate networks of traders operating in several markets simultaneously or the overall complexity of spatial market networks (Fackler and Tastan, 2008) .
6 Subscripts indicate the direction of trade flows. For example, m ijt = P jt − P it , indicates the intermarket price differential for goods flowing from market i to market j in period t. Similarly, transactions costs to move commodities from market i to market j are listed as τ ijt .
7 As has been pointed out by Dercon (1995) and others (Goodwin and Piggott, 2001 ), the long-run equilibrium relationship between prices and transactions costs may involve price movements that are proportional to one another, rather one-for-one, net of transactions costs. Hence the inclusion of the β parameters in equation (2).
8 Barrett (1996) , Fackler and Goodwin (2002) and others have noted that cointegration is neither necessary nor sufficient for market efficiency, and that violations of some common assumptions underlying cointegration models, like stationary transport costs and continuous trade flows, may be more to blame for the frequent rejection of efficiency found in the literature than an absence of efficiency itself. We attempt to address some of these issues in this work.
9 The speed of adjustment parameters can be more easily expressed as a half-life, T half , which indicates how long it takes for half of the deviation from long run equilibrium to be corrected.
a k is the parameter estimate from the matrix A for the price margin (k = m) and the transactions costs (k = τ ) equation, respectively (Dercon and Van Campenhout (1999) . In all of our estimates, since our time observations are semi-weekly, T half has been multiplied by 3.5 (days/semi-week) to convert the half-life into units of days, rather than 'semi-weeks.'
10 Note that the cointegrating vector β in equation (2) has been normalized such that β 0 /β 1 = B 0 and β 2 /β 1 = B 1 . This simplifies our subsequent work by eliminating any concerns about the existence of multiple cointegrating vectors.
11 Equation (5) is just a reformulation of the efficient spatial arbitrage condition shown in (1a) that prevails when trade flows do not occur due to excessively high transactions costs.
12 I 1t and I 2t represent indicator functions that divide the observations into two groups based on the location of the error correction term relative to the unknown threshold. Given the absence of transactions cost data in many market network price datasets, their effects are often modeled similarly modeled like such an unobserved threshold that divides observations into periods where trade is positive and efficient and into periods where transactions costs exceed the price margin between two potential markets.
13 Also, assuming linearity in the case of nonlinear long-run equilibrium relationships results in inconsistent estimation of the (misspecified) cointegration vector (Gonzalo and Pitarakis, 2006) .
14 Only market dyads are considered in our analysis and the SECM does not take into explicit account the possible higher order effects of trade in a network with multiple linkages. See Fackler and Tastan (2008) on this issue.
15 Harare is the capital of Zimbabwe and is close to major tomato production areas, which may explain the fact that there are no trade flow reversals observed during the sample year.
16 Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics were used to determine the integration order of the different time series. Details are available from the authors by request.
17 Note that this threshold is not determined by the size of the error correction term, as elsewhere in the threshold error-correction literature (e.g., Hansen and Seo (2002) ).
18 The Johansen (1988) trace test is a method of testing for cointegration that is essentially a multivariate version of the Dickey Fuller unit root test.
The trace test looks for non-stationarity in a system of time series variables by examining the rank of the parameter matrix that describes system relationships.
19 Lag length tests using VAR appropriate portmanteau statistics (Brüggeman et al., 2004) show that the single lag structure is appropriate for all market pairs. 
